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Altruistic actions are generally
seen as ‘noble’. Yet some ‘lowly’
organisms are apt to match the
most heroic human acts of
devotion and self-sacrifice. To use
a widely-quoted example,
consider Dicrocoelium
dendriticum, also known as
brainworm. These parasites spend
some of their stages in the innards
of cows, exit in the feces and, in
the form of cercaria, are eaten by
ants a few stages later. Once
ingested, a gang of cercaria will
break through the ant’s stomach
wall. One of them makes it to the
brain of the ant, and causes it to
climb on the tips of grass blades,
thus exposing itself to be taken up
by the grazing cattle. The other
cercaria form cysts in the ant’s
body, ready to pursue their life-
cycle within the cow that swallows
them. But the one who made it to
the brain — the ‘brainworm’ —
dies without leaving offspring. It
has effectively sacrificed itself for
the survival of its gang. In
humans, comparable feats would
be the stuff of epic poetry.
Small wonder that evolutionary
biologists feel challenged by such
behaviour and see it as a high
priority aim ‘to take the altruism
out of altruism’. To begin this task,
they define the term ‘altruism’ in
purely Darwinian terms, devoid of
any moralistic undertones. An
action performed by individual A
and affecting individual B is said
to be altruistic if it increases the
fitness — the reproductive
success — of the recipient B, and
decreases the fitness of A. In this
context, one may as well give
names to the other possible
scenarios: if the action increases
the fitness of both A and B, one
speaks of cooperation; of spite, 
if it decreases both fitnesses; 
and of selfishness if A’s fitness 
is enhanced and B’s fitness
diminished. Both altruistic and
spiteful traits lower the
reproductive success of their
bearers and seem at first
inconsistent with the action of
natural selection. Yet they
abound.
The suicidal behaviour of the
brainworm is a spectacular
example of reproductive altruism.
The other cercaria could not even
reach their egg-laying stage
otherwise. Further forms of
reproductive altruism occur in the
brood care of social insects. The
worker castes consist of sterile
individuals representing a dead
end for the germ line.
Nevertheless, it is their task to
take care of the brood and even to
commit suicide for the
community’s defence. In a wide
variety of tropical bird species,
unmated individuals — mostly
males — help a breeding pair 
raise offspring. Similar
alloparenting behaviour occurs
among some fish and mammals,
for instance cichlids, naked mole
rats, or jackals.
The behaviour of foster-parents
towards fledgling cuckoos falls
also under the definition of
reproductive altruism. Other
frequently studied candidates for
altruism are the grooming
behaviour so widespread among
animals, the alarm calls of birds
and monkeys and the pronking —
bouncing along on stiff legs — of
gazelles. Yet another form of
altruism is the restraint frequently
observed by the winner of a
contest. It lowers the winner’s
fitness as the loser may eventually
return and win the next fight.
The most widespread reason for
altruistic behaviour is doubtlessly
kinship. The assistance provided
to offspring by their parents has
such an obvious value for the
parents’ own fitness that it
actually hardly qualifies as
altruism. But individuals have a
genetic stake not only in their
children, but also in their
grandchildren, and indeed in all
their relatives. This was already
recognised by Darwin, although
he could not ground it firmly in
population genetics. A proper
theory of kin selection was
elaborated by W.D. Hamilton in
the 1960s. Following Dawkins, it is
usually explained from the gene’s
point of view. A gene increasing
the propensity to help siblings, for
instance, will promote individuals
who are likely to bear copies of
that gene and therefore favours its
own spreading.
Hamilton’s rule encapsulates
this neatly: consider a gene
causing its bearer A to perform an
action towards a recipient B. This
gene will increase in frequency if
the relatedness between A and B,
that is the probability that they
share copies of that gene which
are identical by descent, exceeds
the ratio between fitness cost (to
the bearer A) and fitness benefit
(to the recipient B). In a phrase
probably going back to J.B.S.
Haldane, it ‘pays’ to die if this
saves more than two brothers. The
suicidal behaviour of the brain-
worm, for instance, represents a
trifling cost compared with the
survival of the rest of the ingested
cercaria, who are most likely sibs.
Hamilton’s rule is only the tip of
the iceberg of an elaborate theory
based on the notion of inclusive
fitness where one considers the
effects of an action not only on
the reproductive success of the
actor, but also on that of all those
affected, each weighted with the
proper relatedness coefficient.
Such computations are not easy,
as they can lead to the trap of
‘double counting’, and are often
plagued by the intricacies of
inbreeding. An important
theoretical tool is the Price
equation, which expresses the
increase in a gene’s frequency in a
neat formula describing selection
within groups and selection
among groups.
Kin selection led to remarkable
progress in explaining social
behaviour in communities with
strong family ties, and allowed
new levels of detail to be reached
in studying conflicts of interest, for
instance between brothers and
sisters in hymenopteran insects
like ants and bees, where males
have no fathers and relatedness is
not necessarily symmetric.
Moreover, kin selection allows
conflicts between generations,
and in particular between parent
and offspring to be addressed.
Altruistic actions may come easily
to parents, but there remains the
question of how to split the cost
of the parental investment
between mother and father, and
how to divide the effort among the
children, including those as yet
unborn. Questions of this type
have also greatly stimulated the
study of life histories. How many
seasons can a bird afford to 
serve its parents as a nest helper,
for instance?
By now, thousands of instances
of altruism based on kin selection
have been documented, and
almost every social interaction
trait is routinely analysed in terms
of relatedness. As a side effect,
such investigations, often using
genetic markers, have drawn
attention to mechanisms of kin
recognition among animals. In
many cases they prove to be
amazingly efficient, but
sometimes fail and leave the door
open for exploitation, most
spectacularly by the cuckoo and
other brood parasites. Further
examples of misdirected brood
care are furnished by enslaved
worker ants.
After so much progress with kin
selection, it seems today difficult
to conceive that helping behaviour
among relatives could ever have
been viewed as a challenge to
Darwinism. The appearence of
altruism was based on sloppy
reasoning, such as ignoring
inclusive fitness effects. This
agrees well with the vernacular
view, where nepotism is not seen
as altruism, but as a subversive
form of selfishness.
What remains a challenge is
altruism among non-relatives. The
founding event in this field was a
paper by Trivers expounding
reciprocal altruism. This occurs
when altruistic acts, for which the
cost is less than the benefit, are
repeatedly exchanged between
two individuals. Both, then, get a
net increase in fitness. This type of
altruism, summarized in the
principle ‘you scratch my back
and I’ll scratch yours’, is based on
economic rather than genetic ties,
and seems much more fragile. The
return of an altruistic move
towards a relative is immediate, as
the genetic correlation is already
in place. But an eventual return
through reciprocation can usually
take place only later. Such
altruistic acts are speculative
investments in the future. It will
often be easy, for the recipient, to
cheat. This quandary is
traditionally modelled by the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
although usually based on
simultaneous actions by two
players. If both cooperate and help
another, both get a reward; but if
only one player helps the other,
this player will incur a cost in
fitness, and the other, the
defector, will experience a benefit
without having to pay for the
return. No matter whether the
other player cooperates or
defects, it is best to defect in 
this game.
So how can reciprocal altruism
evolve? Trivers showed that if the
interaction was repeated
sufficiently often, cooperative
strategies based on reciprocation
could persist: it would not pay to
defect if there was a high
probability for another round of
the game, giving the other player
an opportunity to retaliate (the
‘shadow of the future’). Following
a landmark paper by Axelrod 
and Hamilton, the theory of
reciprocal altruism was
extensively developed, often
boosted by computer simulations
modelling the evolution of
strategies in the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game based
on selection-mutation chronicles
of artificial populations.
The basic result here is that
when the interaction is sufficiently
likely to be long-lasting, a small
cluster of players using retaliatory
strategies can invade a population
of defectors. A minority of
defectors, on the other hand,
cannot invade a population of
stern retaliators. However, such a
population can be weakened by
the spreading of indiscriminate
altruists, who may pave the way
for the successful return of
defectors exploiting their lack of a
defensive mechanism. 
Unfortunately, the empirical
evidence for reciprocal altruism
lags behind theory. A handful of
examples have kept circulating for
years: predator inspection by fish
where for example two stickle-
backs help each other if they
jointly approach a predatory pike.
Egg trading by hermaphrodite fish
who switch between the role of
the male and the more expensive
role of the female several times
during a sexual encounter. And
mouth-to-mouth feeding by
vampire bats; frequently, a 
hungry bat receives some of the
cattle’s blood regurgitated by a
well-fed bat.
Today, the dearth of non-human
examples of reciprocal altruism
appears striking. Apparently, 
the requisites for retaliatory
strategies — long series of
interactions between the same
two individuals, and the cognitive
capabilities to identify partners
and remember their actions — are
hard to find outside primate
communities. Among primates,
however, many forms of
reciprocal altruism are
documented, for instance within
coalitions of young males. In
particular, the human tendency to
reciprocation is evident in daily
life, and has been verified by
many experiments based on
iterations of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. It must be noted
in this context that the simplest
evolutionary mechanisms can
lead to a certain percentage of
altruism — even if the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is not repeated —
provided the players interact, not
with randomly chosen individuals,
but only with their nearest
neighbors. Quite generally,
altruism seems to be favoured by
any form of population viscosity,
even in the absence of
reciprocation.
One speaks of direct
reciprocation if the return of the
help offered by a donor is
provided by the recipient, and of
indirect reciprocation if the return
is obtained through third parties
— ‘give and ye shall be given’.
Indirect reciprocation has been
touted as the basis of all moral
systems. Several behavioural
rules have been proposed to
implement indirect reciprocation,
essentially based on status
considerations. If the score of an
individual increases whenever that
individual performs an act of help,
and decreases if the individual
refuses to help, then a strategy of
helping only those with a high
score effectively channels altruism
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towards other altruists, and hence
discriminates against defectors.
Such strategies, and variants
thereof, have been shown to
operate in experiments with
human groups. In computer
simulations, however, such
indirect reciprocation is often
threatened by the emergence, first
of do-gooders giving
indiscriminately to all comers, and
then of non-reciprocating
exploiters. The reason is that
discriminators refusing to help
low-scorers thereby lower their
own score, and hence their
chance of being helped. Stabler
regimes of discriminating altruism
can be obtained through
strategies which take into account
whether a potential recipient’s
former refusals to help have been
directed toward invertebrate
exploiters or toward deserving
altruists. This, however, requires
considerable cognitive
sophistication, and plenty of
information about the past of the
other group members.
So far we have considered
interactions mostly between two
individuals. Reciprocal altruism
becomes considerably more
difficult to sustain within larger
groups. This is well evidenced in
so-called public goods games, a
staple of experimental economy.
Four players receive twenty
dollars each, and decide how
much of the sum to invest in the
common pool, keeping the rest to
themselves. The experimenter
then doubles the content of the
pool and divides it evenly among
the four players, irrespective of
their contribution. If all players
contribute fully, they double their
payoff. But for each player, each
dollar invested yields only a return
of fifty cents, so that the selfish
strategy is to invest nothing. In
actual experiments, humans
invest a considerable part of their
endowment. After several rounds
of this game, however, most
contributions have dropped to
zero. The reason seems to be that
the only possibility of retaliating
against players who contribute
less than average is to reduce
one’s own contributions, which
effectively unravels cooperation.
The picture changes drastically if,
after every round of the public
goods game, players have the
opportunity of inflicting fines
against specific co-players. The
fines do not go to the punishers,
and hence punishment is an
unselfish activity. On the contrary,
imposing a fine is costly to the
punisher. Nevertheless, one
observes a great propensity to
punish free riders, together with
strong moralistic aggression.
Players of such a public goods
game obviously anticipate this:
they contribute more, and if the
game is repeated for a few
rounds, the contributions 
actually increase.
Punishing strategies to 
maintain cooperative behaviour
are well know in animal 
societies, for instance among
wasps, naked mole rats and
chimpanzees. If it serves to
ensure future benefits to the
punisher, costly punishment can
be interpreted as a selfish act.
However, recent experiments on
humans have shown strong
punishing behaviour even if the
possibility of future benefits,
through another round of the
public goods game for example, is
excluded. This is usually called
altruistic punishment, although in
the strict sense it falls under the
definition of spite, as it lowers the
fitness of both parties involved.
Whether such socially beneficial
instances of spite occur in non-
human communities remains 
to be seen.
Experiments have revealed that
in human groups, reward can play
a role similar to punishment: if,
between the rounds of a public
goods game, two players are
chosen randomly and one can
donate a gift to the other, the
probability that this will happen
increases with the contributions of
the recipient in the public goods
game; and this stabilises the
average contributions to the
common pool on a high level.
In each case, altruistic actions
are greatly boosted if they are
broadcast within the group.
According to the handicap
principle, this can be viewed as a
costly signal of an individual’s
fitness. The evolution of cognitive
abilities and language — as
evidenced in the role of gossip —
must have fostered the score-
keeping behind direct and indirect
reciprocation, and facilitated the
emergence of moralistic emotions
such as sympathy, guilt, anger,
conscience — our ‘good nature’,
in the words of de Waal.
Eventually, this may have led to
the emotional appreciation of
altruism as something precious
and noble.
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